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Abstract 
Although globalization was built on increased world trade, the movement of capital has 
accelerated faster in the past two decades. It is this free flow of capital that is offering 
African countries renewed hope of tapping global markets for the much needed resources 
to aid their economic growth while becoming fully integrated into the global economy.  
While past studies tackling external resource flows to Africa have focused on either 
official or private capital flows, this paper analyses both types of capital flows with the 
intention of providing a clearer picture on composition and magnitude of external 
resources to Africa. Three types of capital flows – Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Workers Remittances – emerge as key to 
tackling Africa’s development problems. Together, these flows account for the bulk of 
resources to Africa. In addition, they have built-in advantages for economic development 
hence are more suited to addressing Africa’s growth challenges.  To this end, African 
countries must enact policies that directly relate to aiding effectiveness of these flows.  
 
1. Introduction 
Lack of investment capital has been blamed for the lack of economic progress in African 
economies. It is therefore not surprising that attracting capital flows has been at the core 
of strategies advocated by policy makers worldwide1. However, the problem with 
strategies put forward has been the lack of consistency in the types of capital flows ideal 
for Africa.  Initial studies placed a lot of emphasis on official flows, while recent studies 
have focused on private capital flows particularly foreign direct investment. Given the 
limitations inherent in each strategy, the central thrust of this paper is that a holistic 
approach to capital flows seems appropriate. To this end, focus of African countries must 
be to enact policies that create and enhance synergies between the various types of flows.  
Africa’s need for external resources is demonstrated by its wide savings- 
investment gaps spanning a magnitude of well over 20 percent. Lately, the need for 
external resources has been highlighted by Africa’s sluggish progress towards 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, hence the need to harness both 
official and private capital flows. Against this backdrop, African economies have 
embarked on extensive reforms and liberalization of their economies to be the choice 
destinations of foreign capital. While Africa’s performance has not been spectacular, it is 
important to understand what has been happening by revisiting trends of capital flows 
with the main purpose of identifying relevant flows for Africa’s economic progress. 
In this study, we analyze trends in disaggregated foreign capital inflows. The 
trends in Africa are analyzed from the perspective of flows to developing countries. The 
                                                 
1 UNCTAD (2005): “Economic Development in Africa- Rethinking the Role of Foreign Direct 
Investment”. 13 September, United Nations, Geneva. 
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main aim of the paper is to shed light on the composition, magnitude, source and sectoral 
distribution of capital flows to Africa.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents trends of 
capital flows to developing countries and narrows down to trends in Africa. Sections 3, 4 
and 5 examine in detail official development assistance, foreign direct investment and 
workers remittances, respectively. Section 6 concludes and discusses policy 
recommendations.   
 
2. Capital Flows to Developing Countries 
Developing countries are recipients of both official and private capital flows. Official 
flows consist of official development assistance and official aid that come in the form of 
grants or loans. Most of the official flows originate from individual country governments 
as bilateral flows or from the World Bank or IMF as multilateral flows. Private capital 
flows, on the other hand include bank and trade related lending, foreign direct 
investment, portfolio investments, and lately workers’ remittances.  
According to UNCTAD’s 2000 report, collective capital inflows to developing 
countries have gone through three distinct phases since the mid-1970s: 
 From 1975 to the early 1980s, total inflows increased rapidly mainly as a result of 
a surge in syndicated bank lending. During this period, official financing was 
sustained although its share in the total fell.  
 The 1980s saw the outbreak of the debt crisis that led to a decline in total inflows 
due to reduced bank lending. 
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 The 1990s and beyond witnessed a sharp increase in total capital inflows as a 
result of a surge in private capital flows, notably portfolio and foreign direct 
investment, while official flows declined. Commercial bank loans accounted, on 
average, for roughly one-tenth of private capital flows to developing countries 
over the period 1990-1997, portfolio investment for about a third, and FDI for 
about a half of such flows (UNCTAD, 1998). Table 1 below illustrates the trend 
from 1991 to 2004.  
Table 1: Private Capital Flows and Officials Flows to Developing Countries  
(Billion of Dollars) 
 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004e
Total Capital Flows 123.0 155.8 220.4 223.7 261.2 311.2 342.6 334.9 264.5 295.8 205.2 200.9 282.1 323.8
Net Private Flows 62.1 99.3 166.8 175.7 206.1 279.3 299.8 280.3 219.2 256.4 150.3 163.5 250.4 301.3
Net Official Flows 60.9 56.5 53.6 48.0 55.1 31.9 42.8 54.6 45.3 38.6 54.9 37.4 31.7 22.5 
Share of 
ODA/Total (%)  49.5 36.3 24.3 21.5 21.1 10.3 12.5 16.3 17.1 13.0 
    
26.8 
    
18.6 
    
11.2 
      
6.95 
Source: Various World Bank Global Development Finance Reports, (e = estimate) 
The latest UNCTAD reports show that foreign direct investment has gained a lot 
of steam in the past few years, but the 2006 Global Development Finance Report declares 
2005 a landmark year in global development finance in both the official and private 
spheres.  However, analyzing the aggregate figures for developing countries shields a lot 
of variations within regions (see Figures A.1- A.5 in the Appendix). Africa has long been 
a non-participant of bank and trade related lending while it receives very little portfolio 
investments. Contrary to what is suggested by the aggregate trends, ODA flows to Africa 
have remained strong, declining moderately but still maintaining an upward trend2. 
Figure A.6 clearly shows ODA, FDI and workers’ remittances to be the most significant 
                                                 
2 Figures include debt relief.  
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flows for Africa. These three types of flows are in turn analyzed in detail in the next 
sections. 
 
3. Official Development Assistance to Africa 
ODA defined as those flows originating from official agencies, including state and local 
governments, has been used to put up infrastructure critical for the development of other 
sectors of the economy. By characterization, ODA includes capital projects, food aid, 
emergency relief, peace keeping efforts and technical cooperation (Ali, Malwanda and 
Suliman, 1999). With ODA flows’ main objective as promotion of economic 
development and welfare of developing countries, ODA has long repayment horizons 
suitable for infrastructure projects with long gestation periods. In addition, ODA’s 
concessionality makes it affordable to poor country governments typical of African 
economies. 
ODA flows to Africa declined as part of a broader trend of the decline in total 
official flows to developing countries in the late 1990s, but remained a significant 
component of external financial flows to the region. Throughout the past three decades 
ODA flows show a general upward climb in nominal terms growing significantly 
between the mid-1970s and early 1990s and resuming growth again in 2001 due to debt 
relief (Figure A.6).  
African countries in the past three decades continued to rely on ODA more 
heavily than other regions of the developing world (Figure A.2). For instance, while 
ODA flows to Africa were as much as $33 per capita in 1991, the average ODA of other 
low-income countries was $14 per capita. Similarly, while ODA flows contributed to 5.3 
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percent of African GNP in 1996, the corresponding proportion for other low-income 
countries was lower at 3.5 percent (Ali et al, 1999). White (2003), by further breaking 
down the regions and looking at specific years, creates a slightly different picture 
showing slackening of assistance to Africa (Table 2).  
Table 2: Regional allocation of net ODA, 1980–2000 (share and per capita)  
Share (% of total Aid) Per capita (US$)  
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 
North Africa 8.1 12.4 4.3 42 68 18 
Sub-Saharan Africa 22.5 30.9 25.3 27 38 22 
South America 2.4 3.6 4.7 5 8 8 
Middle East  15.9 8.2 4.6 76 40 16 
South and Central Asia 16.7 10.6 11.5 8 5 4 
Far East Asia 7.8 12.1 15.4 3 5 5 
Other 26.7 22.2 34.3 66 60 72 
                of which Europe  3.6 2.5 7.4 19 16 43 
Total 100 100 100 14 15 12 
Source: White (2003), pg 8 
 
The slight slackening of assistance to Africa can be partly explained by a shift of 
European donors to fellow European countries.  For example, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and Bosnia–Herzegovina are now among the top recipients of aid from 
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland all of whom have seen a reduction in their share of aid 
going to Africa of more than 10% (White, 2003). In addition, more aid is going towards 
trouble spots around the globe, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and lately as emergency 
relief to tsunami-affected areas.  
Some of the recent boost in ODA flows reflects debt relief granted under the 
HIPC Initiative and other special purpose grants both directly attributable to the efforts of 
the G-8 countries to put Africa on a sustainable development path. Debt relief grants in 
2005 totaled $23 billion, up more than five-fold of its 2004 figure. The graph below 
shows that aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as percentage of total aid has, for the most 
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part, been more than triple that of other regions emphasizing the importance of these 
official flows to the region. 
Figure 1: Aid (% of Gross Capital Formation)
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The top recipient countries for ODA within Africa have varied although, since the 
late 1990s, the list has included Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Mozambique, 
Uganda, Madagascar, Ghana, Ethiopia and Zambia (Ali et al 1999, Figure A.7). These 
countries are part of those classified as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). Most 
of the aid goes to the social sector of the economy for purposes of improving education, 
health and infrastructure development3.  
 While African governments have little control over the official assistance they 
receive, they must use the aid effectively to build infrastructure that support growth in 
                                                 
3 Statistics on sector allocation of aid and aid donors are already presented in summary form by OECD. 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/27/7504863.PDF 
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other sectors of the economy. Since sound infrastructure is one of the determinants of 
FDI, wise use of official assistance can spur growth of FDI and other types of private 
capital flows. This seems to be already happening in Ghana, a country that was once a 
major recipient of ODA and now is among the top ten recipients of FDI in Africa4.  FDI 
flows are the second largest flows to African economies and have the advantage that they 
can be influenced by country governments. 
 
4. Trends in Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment is defined as an investment involving a long-term relationship 
and reflecting a lasting interest and control of a resident entity in one economy (foreign 
direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than 
that of the foreign direct investor. FDI typically occurs when the parent company: 
• Obtains sufficient common stock in a foreign company to assume voting control;  
• Acquires or constructs new plants and equipment overseas;  
• Shifts funds abroad to finance an expansion of its foreign subsidiary; or  
• Reinvests earnings of the parent company’s foreign subsidiary in plant expansion 
(Carbaugh, 2002). 
Compared to other sources of private capital flows, FDI has become the investment 
vehicle of choice. One critical distinguishing factor of FDI is that it is motivated largely 
by the investor’s long term prospects for making profits in the activities that they control. 
Consequently, FDI has proved resilient during financial crises, creating stability that 
developing nations require for continued economic growth. Second, FDI has some 
                                                 
4 http://www.gipc.org.gh/documents/WebRPT3Q06.pdf 
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inherent advantages for development: non-debt creating, risk sharing, market discipline, 
export orientation, and the transfer of technology and managerial expertise. It with such 
attributes in mind that the economics literature has emphasized the role of FDI for 
Africa's development.  Without FDI, Africa would foreclose its option to growth. With 
growth foreclosed, there would be no way out of Africa’s poverty and its attendant 
problems (Ikiara, 2003; Tandon, 20005).  
A glance at FDI statistics shows a tremendous upward climb in the last decade of 
global flows. These impressive figures, however, disguise considerable variation across 
and within regions. For example, while flows to developing countries increased between 
1970 and 1994 from $5 billion to $173 billion, three-quarters of this money went to just 
ten countries, mostly in East and South-East Asia and Latin America.  
Figure 2: FDI Inflows to Developing Countries and Select Regions,
 1970-2004
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5 The statement was used as rhetoric. 
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In general, FDI flows into Africa were low and rather static prior to 1980, exce
during and following the oil crises in 1974 when heavy investments were made in the oil
pt 
 
producing countries (UNCTAD, 1999). However, it should be noted that prior to 1980, 
FDI inflows in developing countries as a whole were relatively insignificant in 
comparison to those of the world total. FDI inflows to the developing countries increased 
continuously from 1983 to reach about $30 billion in 1989 (UNCTAD, 1991). From 
1985, those flows grew at an annual rate of 22 percent compared to 3 percent from 1980 
to 1984 and 13 percent from 1975 to 1979.  
The trend in Africa, though positive, has been unimpressive as the continent 
lagged behind other developing regions. FDI inflows steadily increased from an annual 
average of approximately $0.9 billion in 1970-80 to $2.4 billion in 1981-1990 and $7.1 
billion in 1991-2000 (see Figure 3 below). They reached their peak in 2001, reaching 
approximately $20 billion before falling drastically in 2002 and peaking again in 2003.  
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Figure 3: FDI Inflows in Africa
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Africa both doubled for the 1996-2001 period. As a result, Africa’s percent share in total 
inflows to developing countries dropped significantly from a high of 23 percent in 1970-
75 to almost 11 per cent in 1976-80, 6 percent in 1991-1995 and to 4.7 percent in 1996- 
2000 (see Figures 2 and 4).  Furthermore, the UNCTAD FDI data shows that foreign 
direct investment to Africa declined from $12.8 billion in 1999 to $8.7 billion in 2000, 
ttributable to the decrease of inflows into Angola, mainly due to 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC online Database  
However, though FDI inflows into Africa show a general upward movement in 
absolute terms, Africa’s share of total FDI relative to all developing countries has been
thinning. Inflows to developing countries as a group quadrupled from an average of 
billion in 1981-1985 to an average of $81.6 billion in the 1991-1995 period, whereas 
inflows into Africa only doubled during that time. Inflows to developing countries and 
bringing down the share in world FDI inflows to below 1%. Analysis shows that the 
ecline was mostly ad
 10
cyclical investment behavior in its petroleum extraction industry, and South Africa, as a 
result of reduced privatization and mergers and acquisitions activity (UNCTAD, 2000). 
During the same time, strong increases in flows were reported for Lesotho, Mauritius and 
Tanzania, while flows were largely unchanged for the rest of FDI recipients (Landrey et 
al, 2002). Within SSA, the Southern Africa Development Community6 (SADC) remained 
the most important sub-region in terms of FDI inflows.   
Africa's share in total average annual inflows to developing countries increased 
from 9 percent in the 1980-1984 period to 12 percent in the 1985-1989 period, with oil 
exporting countries in Africa accounting for the bulk of the increase. In absolute terms, 
inflows to Africa reached $4.3 billion in 1989, two times the level reached in the early 
ncreased significantly, although Nigeria received m st 
SSA countries, FDI inflows remained below 
$0.5 billion during this period. In the 1990s, 
                                                
1980s. FDI in SSA countries also i o
of those flows. For the non-oil exporting 
the average share was slightly above 5 
percent and increased in the 2000s to average more than 10 percent, an increase that 
could be attributed to increased flows into the region from other developing countries. 
 
6 The countries of the SADC are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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Figure 4: The share of Africa FDI inflows in total flows into developing countries, 1970-2004
45.00
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
Years
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 (%
)
 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/ TNC Database 
 
At the global level, 1993 marked the end of the FDI recession that had prevailed 
in 1991 and 1992, with global outflows increasing by 17 percent to reach $222 billion. It 
l in 1994. At about $3 billion in 1993 and $3.1 
billion in 1994, FDI flows into Africa remained stagnant despite the liberalization of 
investment regimes by a number of countries (UNCTAD, 1995)7. As a result, Africa’s 
share of all flows into developing countries declined to 5 percent compared with the 11 
percent average during 1986-1990.  In 1997, FDI flows amounted to more than $10 
billion. At this level, the share of Africa in world total FDI remained a mere 2.3 percent 
amidst proclamation that 1997 was a year of significant rise in inflows. After this period, 
was maintained at almost the same leve
                                                 
7 These figures are lower than those obtained recently online due to exclusion of flows to economies in 
North Africa and revisions in figures in the later publications. 
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the share slightly increased though it stayed below 3 percent according to the UNCTAD 
data as shown in Figure 5 below. 
 Figure 5: Africa FDI Inflows as a Percentage of World Total
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In 1998, FDI flows into de
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC online Database 
veloping countries declined by 4 percent due to mainly 
reduced ng South 
 
ne 
as 
from $8 
billion in 1999 to $6.5 billion in 2000. A sharp drop of inflows into Angola and South 
Africa mainly caused this decline. Zimbabwe also experienced a significant drop in 
 FDI into Indonesia, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Inflows to Africa (excludi
Africa) increased moderately compared to 1997. However, including South Africa, the
continent registered a decline in FDI inflows. This result shows that South Africa is o
of the big players in driving the FDI trends for the continent. A further decrease w
registered in 2000 among SSA countries where total FDI in absolute terms went 
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inflow and only $30 million in 2000 
(UNC st double the amount received 
in 2000. This time, Angola was one of the best performing host economies for foreign 
direct investment, together with Hong Kong, China and Belgium (UNCTAD, 2002). 
 lts for the continent. Africa’s 
inflow  billion in 2001. As a result, 
the region’s share in global FDI fell from 2.3% in 2001 to 1.7% in 2002. Hidden within 
this trend is that if w xclu  large cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
deals  2002 actually increased by 8 
percent (UNCTAD, 2003). Thus it is noticeable are really driven by 
a few major players, while for the rest of the continent there is stagnation. Finally, FDI 
ow
k  natural resources and a 
val of cross border M&As. Not surprisingly, natural resource rich countries (Angola, 
d uatorial Guinea, Nigeria and South Africa) continued to be the principal 
in
try’s GDP, African 
nomies appear to do much better. In fact, for the majority of the countries, there is 
e r  bet n Africa and other developing regi rds inward FDI. 
le eloping world, best 
strates this point, with Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho and Angola standing out. 
s, from $444 million in 1998 to $59 million in 1999 
TAD, 2001). In 2001, FDI inflows rose again to almo
The year 2002 presented some very interesting resu
s declined to $11 billion in 2002 after a surge to $19
e e de the
in Morocco and South Africa in 2001, FDI inflows in
that FDI fluctuations 
infl
pea
revi
Cha
dest
eco
littl
Tab
illu
s to Africa rose by 28 percent to $15 billion in 2003 but fell short of their 2001 
of $20 billion. The recovery was led by investment in
, Eq
ations (UNCTAD, 2004).  
When FDI is expressed as a proportion of each coun
diffe ence wee ons as rega
dev 3, which presents figures for select countries in the 
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199  2 00 001 20 2 003 
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Ghana 0.3 0. . .2 3 3 1. 1. 8 6 3 0 4 2.1 4.3 1.7 1.7 1.2 2.2 3  . 7 0 1. 1.
India 0.1 0. . 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.9 .5 0 8 1. 1. 8 8 0 0 1 0.6 0  . 1 1 0. 0.
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Swazil 3.4 9. .7   1. -1.0 .3 6 6 2. 7. - .2 9 and 0 8 6.8 5.5 3.8 7 11.4 7  . 2 5 3 2.
Tanzan 0.0 0. .3 2. .0 5 1 3. 2. 5 3 ia 0 0 0.5 1.1 2.3 2.3 1 2.1 6  . 6 5 2. 2.
Ugand -0.1 0. .1 1.7 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.8 3.2 .3 2 7 2. 3. 2 3 a 0 0 2  . 7 2 3. 3.
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Source: d  o  I tWorl  Bank Devel pment ndica ors  
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China is one of the largest recipients of FDI in Asia but the amount it receives 
relative to its gross domestic product is less than that of countries like Lesotho in the 
can countries receive 
f the 
53 African countries, the ratio of FDI inflows to gross fixed capital formation in 1998- 
her t ntries as a 
 Inf ross Fixed
Year -80  1997 1 3 
Africa region, although Lesotho receives a very small amount in absolute value terms. 
Indonesian figures also portray a similar picture. Several other Afri
more FDI relative to GDP than the average developing country. Moreover, for 22 o
2000 was hig han that for developing cou whole8. 
Table 4: FDI lows as a Percentage of G  Capital Formation 
75 81-85 86-90 91-95 1996 998 1999 2000 2001 2002 200
Angola 0.0 4.7 7.6 52.98 6.9 21.1 48.6 86.8 28 66.7 49.7 43.9 
Botswana 17.6 16.9 15.5 -4.52 6.6 8.6 7.8 2.7 4.3 2.6 33.1 6.9 
Congo, 
Dem
Republic of 8.3 1 .6 
ocratic 
-1.4 -1.3 -0.12 2.8 -8.8 3.5 1.2 1.8 25.6 29 23
Lesotho 0.7 5.6 .5 8.2 8.6 8.8 9.6 2.9 4.9 3.88 5.1 6.1 7
Malawi 5.1 4.6 3.6 0.72 7.1 6 6.2 26.1 11.4 10.1 4.3 12.4 
Mozambique 0.2 33.1 47.9 7.5 33.1 20.8 29.9 0.1 0.7 7.2 12.6 9.3 
Namibia 0.0  12.3 1.9 2.0 18.88 15.7 11.7 9.9 2.5 29 53 26 
Seychelles 19.5 1.7 2  26.0 31.9 19.68 18 3 6.3 31.7 30.9 30.7 23 28.9
Sout -0.6 3 h Africa 0.2 -0.4 1.68 3.5 15.5 2.5 7.5 4.7 40.9 4.8 
Swa 20.6 3 18.2 ziland 5.4 41.5 31.52 8.3 -5.3 6.1 38.8 32.8 22.3 22.4 
United Republic 
of Tanzania 0.5 14 1 5.6 0.6 0.1 4.4 13.9 2.8 40.8 17.8 29.8 14.9 1
Zambia 6.3 4 6.2 6.6 37.4 10.28 8.2 14.1 1.3 32.5 21.8 10.5 13.4 1
Zimbabwe 1.3 2.7 5.2 8.9 33.8 6.7 2.5 0.5 3.5 2.5 0.0 -1.0 
Source: UNCTAD FDI/TNC online database 
Flows of FDI as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation are comparable to 
fficial flows showing the importance of FDI to Africa. 
 
ion 
the percentage with respect to o
Table 4 gives a sample of the ratios for select countries. On the aggregate and in-line with
the general trend in flows, FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital format
also grew from 12 percent in 2002 to 14 percent in 2003. The relatively high FDI/GFCF 
ratio reflects the relative smallness of many African economies, their inadequate 
                                                 
8 See Appendix of the 2002 World Investment Report for more detail. 
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domestic savings and investment, and the relatively larger developmental impact of FD
in the continent (UNCTAD, 1999). 
  Table 5 below, from the 2005 World Investment Rep
I 
ort, shows the volume of 
FDI inf
 
 
lows and ranking of African countries for 2003 and 2004.  
Table 5: Africa – Country Distribution of FDI inflows, by Range, 2003, 2004  
2003  2004  
Range  Economy * Economy * 
M
b
ore than $2.0 
illion  Angola, Morocco and Nigeria  Nigeria and Angola  
$1.0-1.9 billion  Equatorial Guinea and Sudan  Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and Egypt  
$ South Africa, Chad, Algeria, Tunisia and  
ria, 
Africa and 0.5-0.9 billion  United Republic of Tanzania  
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Alge
Morocco, Congo, Tunisia, South 
Ethiopia  
$
Egypt, Mauritania, Uganda, Gabon, 
te d’ 
Ivoire, Zambia, Gabon, Mauritania, 
a and 
0.1-0.4 billion  
Ethiopia, Botswana, Mozambique, Congo,  
Zambia, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Namibia, Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, Ghana and Mali  
Chad, United Republic of Tanzania, Cô
Namibia, Uganda, Mali, Ghana,  
Mozambique, Libyan Arab Jamahiriy
Guinea  
Less tha
billion  Djibouti, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Gambia,  Togo, Seychelles, Zimbabwe, Sao 
, 
inea-
Bissau, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Comoros, 
  
n $0.1 
Kenya, Guinea, Mauritius, Seychelles,  
Senegal, Benin, Lesotho, Togo, 
Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, Gambia, 
Eritrea, Cape Verde, Madagascar, Niger, 
Senegal, Swaziland, Mauritius, Benin, 
Tome and Principe, Lesotho, Botswana, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Burkina Faso, 
Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau,  Central African 
Republic, Sierra Leone,  Liberia, 
Comoros, Cameroon, Somalia,  Burundi 
and Swaziland  
Djibouti, Eritrea, Cape Verde, Liberia
Niger, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, Gu
Cameroon and Central African  Republic
Source: UNCTAD, WIR 2005 (FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) and annex table B.1).  
*Countries are listed in order of the magnitude of FDI inflows for each respective year.  
 
Source of Africa Bound FDI 
The important sources of FDI for Africa in the 1980s and early 1990s were the Europ
Union, Japan and the United States, the so-called “Triad”. During the 1982 to1996 
period, France, Germany and the United States accounted for 80 percent of FDI inflow
to the continent (UNCTAD, 1997). Other countries 
ean 
s 
gaining importance thereafter were 
Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands. Together with Norway, Portugal, and Spain, these 
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countri 88-
estors – the so 
called “
ged 
nt into Africa amounted to about $20 million, but from 1998 to 
002 that increased six-fold to $120 million (World Bank, 2004). The report indicates 
ent projects in Africa, of which 46 percent are 
dustries.  
ntered 
elb, 2005). The third 
Asian c  
e 
es helped to reduce the rate of decline of Africa’s share of FDI. Between 19
1992 and 1993-1997, these six countries increased their share in African FDI inflows 
from 8 percent to more than 22 percent (UNCTAD, 1999). 
Over the past decade, a noticeable vitality in foreign investment has come from 
the developing countries themselves who are emerging as outward inv
South-South FDI.” UNCTAD (2004), reports the South-South flows to be 
growing far faster than North-South flows. Africa is part of this broad trend, with 
investors from other developing countries, particularly South-East Asia, having emer
as new sources of FDI. A recent World Bank report indicates a massive increase in 
investment from China into SSA through the latter half of the 1990s: between 1990 and 
1997, Chinese investme
2
that there are 450 Chinese-owned investm
in manufacturing, 40 percent in services and only 9 percent in resource-related in
Taiwan has been a major source of FDI into Africa also. Taiwanese investment 
into South Africa increased substantially during the 1980s, but more recently, in response 
to the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA), Taiwanese investment has e
several other Southern and East African countries. Currently, as many as 700 Taiwanese 
investment projects are present throughout sub-Saharan Africa (G
ountry that is rapidly growing as an important investment source in Africa is
India. India is the largest investor in Ghana since 1994 with more than 225 projects 
(GIPC, 2006). An estimated 35 Indian companies are present in South Africa, but th
figure is higher in terms of projects (Gelb, 2005).   
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Much less investment is coming into Africa from Latin America, although 
Brazilian firms are now starting to invest in other Lusophone countries in Africa, Angol
and Mozambique in particular (Ibid). Other significant investors in the region includ
Lebanon and Portugal, albeit for select countries. For instance, Lebanese firms in Ghana
are responsible for more than 175 projects since 1994 (GIPC, 2006). 
Some African firms, particularly from South Africa and Nigeria, are b
MNCs and also investing in other African countries. Since its democracy in 1994, South 
Africa has claim to over 600 projects in the continent9. It accounts for more than 50 
percent of all investments to Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Nigerian firms on the o
a 
e 
 
ecoming 
ther hand, are active in countries within the 
 as 
 U.S investments are concentrated in just four 
ing 
enced a corresponding increase, again in both 
                                                
West African Region.  
 
Sectoral Composition of FDI in Africa 
Like the tendency to concentrate in a few countries, FDI in Africa has tended to 
concentrate in a few economic sectors, traditionally in natural resource industries such
mining and oil10.  For example, U.S investment in SSA countries represents less than 1 
percent of total U.S foreign direct investment and three-quarters of this goes to the 
petroleum industry. Moreover, the bulk of
countries: South Africa, Equatorial Guinea, Angola and Nigeria. 
UNCTAD (1999) reports that FDI stock declined by half of the share in the 
primary sector between 1988 and 1997 globally, as well as in developed and develop
countries. The services sector experi
 
9 This is according to a press clipping count of investment projects done at The EDGE Institute in 2004 (in 
Gelb, 2005). 
10 An exception is South African investments, which cut across sectors. 
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developed and developing countries. Nevertheless, the share of the manufacturing sector 
remained stable, representing the single most important sector in developing countries. 
e 
 most important over the past decade, with a 55 percent 
share in the accumulated FDI to Africa for the period 1996-2000. Oil and petroleum were 
largely
 products as 
te 
, 
e 
rding to the 
 
 
However, data for FDI flows to Africa from major home countries suggest that th
primary sector has remained the
 responsible for this performance. Investment in banking and finance, 
transportation and trading boosted flows for the services industry, while food
well as steel and metal products accounted for the largest share of FDI flows into the 
manufacturing sector.  By observation, FDI in manufacturing has tended to concentra
on the local rather than the export market. 
 While oil accounted for the bulk of the increase in FDI inflows to Africa in 2003
FDI in services is increasing particularly in telecommunications, electricity and retail 
trade. In South Africa, FDI in telecommunications and information technology has 
overtaken that in mining and extraction. FDI in telecommunications is mainly in th
mobile phone services. The number of Africans subscribing to mobile phone services 
grew from 1.2 million in 1996 to 51 million in 2003 (UNCTAD, 2004).  Acco
UNCTAD Press release of September 2004, World FDI flows shifted towards the
services sector for the following reasons: 
 A reflection of the ascendancy of services in economies more generally. 
The non-tradable nature of services. Most services need to be produced when and 
where they are consumed.  As such, FDI has been the principal way to bring 
services to foreign markets. 
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 Liberalization of services FDI regimes in many countries, including privatiz
of state owned utilities. 
ation 
 Service firms investing abroad as they seek new clients and exploit their 
p advantages. 
 in 
South A
 
l to 
owever, 
ownershi
 
In terms of source countries, FDI from Germany is going increasingly into 
manufacturing. More than 60 percent of British FDI stock in Africa is in the 
manufacturing and services sectors (UNCTAD, 1999). The share of US FDI stock in 
Africa that is in the primary sector dropped from 79 percent in 1986 to 53 percent
1996. In terms of industries, US FDI going to manufacturing has been to food and related 
products, primary and fabricated metals, and other manufactures (UNCTAD, 1999). In 
frica, there has been a very rapid move by Indian conglomerates into both the 
services sector (IT, banking) as well as the manufacturing sector, including automotive, 
steel and pharmaceuticals. South African MNCs are in mining, financial services, 
breweries, food processing, retailing, civil engineering and construction, agriculture, 
tourism and hotels, and manufacturing.  Other services include transport and 
telecommunications, and recently the oil and gas sectors, mostly in West Africa 
(UNCTAD, 1999; Gelb, 2005). Some African countries have also hosted South African
investments in the commercial and retail sectors (South Africa Foundation, 2004). 
A survey of MNCs in 2000 indicated that the sectors with the greatest potentia
attract FDI in Africa are tourism, natural resource industries, and industries for which the 
domestic market is important, such as telecommunications (UNCTAD, 2002a). H
the sectoral diversification is encouraging given that it encompasses agriculture and 
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labor-intensive manufacturing – the two sectors that provide the backbone of most 
African economies and hence can make the greatest contribution to poverty reduction. 
 
Mode of Entry 
Since the mid-1980s, cross-border mergers, strategic alliances and acquisitions have been 
e means used by multi-national corporations to enter foreign markets. Cross-border 
mpanies of almost equal sizes come together under common 
r 
he last 
ns 
, this may be a 
tempor
90 
 
                                                
th
mergers occur when two co
ownership. Strategic alliances take place when two companies come together for the 
purpose of accessing each other’s strategic assets (particularly new technology). 
Acquisitions, on the other hand, are undertaken when bigger companies take over smalle
ones and are one of the quickest ways of entering a new market (Bende-Nabende, 2002). 
There is some indication of an increase in the proportion of acquisitions in t
decade as opposed to Greenfield investment, in line with world trends. M&A transactio
increased from an annual average of $0.6 billion in 1990-1994 to over $2.5 billion in 
1995-1999 and $7.5 billion in 2000-200311 (UNCTAD, 2005). However
ary phenomenon as foreign firms take advantage of privatization programs, which 
necessarily draw-in foreign capital via acquisition. Acquisitions were rampant from 19
to 1999 and tended to occur in the primary sector. Greenfield investment continues to 
play an important role and is particularly visible in the service sector.  Other types of FDI
witnessed in the past decade have been participation in a joint venture and licensing. 
 The mode of entry is important to analyze as it may influence the extent to which 
the host country benefits from the presence of foreign owned firms. The World 
Investment Report 2000 explores many of the concerns associated with the impact of 
 
11 This represents 16, 30 and 54 percent of total FDI flows, respectively. 
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acquisitions by foreign companies in developing countries. It concludes that, in the sho
term, acquisitions may have fewer benefits (or larger costs) than Greenfield
rt 
 investment 
ecessarily add to productive cap  in as ree  i e ere
 activity nec ly se CT  20
s’ Remittances
for the host country. This conclusion is driven by the view that acquisitions do not 
n acity  contr t to G nfield nvestm nt wh  
aggregate economic essari increa s (UN AD, 00). 
 
5. Worker  
ces – f me  vi  as  an -ca ans to 
w 
 recognized source of development finance. Most of Africa has been hit by brain drain 
as profe
d 
 
es. 
ment Finance Report, documents some 
ggregate figures. The figures suggest that Africa is tailing other regions. Nevertheless, 
the report acknowledges the shortcoming of these figures which take into consideration 
Finally, workers’ remittan unda ntally ewed  cash d non sh tr fers 
households back home by people working away from their origin communities – are no
a
ssionals have immigrated to other countries in search of greener pastures. While 
the brain drain has largely had a negative effect on the development of Africa, the 
remittances sent by the same have reached significant figures to merit the attention of 
policy makers. In fact, remittances are becoming of scholarly debate in recent years, with 
the main focus being reversing the negative impacts of the brain drain.  
The 2005 Global Development Finance Report estimates that remittances reache
$126 billion in 2004 and continued to show an upward trend. Indeed, the latest report 
from the same source revises this figure upwards to $161 billion for 2004 and pegs them 
at $167 billion for 2005. Remittances seem to be unique in that they appear more evenly
distributed and less volatile than the rest of the capital flows to developing countri
Table 6, extracted from the 2005 Global Develop
a
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remittances channeled via official systems. One would argue that for Africa, it is very 
plausible that an equal or greater amount is channeled via informal means. 
Table 6: Worker’s remittances to developing countries, 1990- 2004 ($ billions) 
 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004e 
Developing Countries 31.3 56.7 76.8 84.6 99.0 116.0 125.8 
Lower middle-income 17.5 34.8 41.9 44.1 49.1 54.8 55.6 
Upper middle-income 5.7 8.6 13.1 18.8 18.7 24.4 26.8 
Low income 8.1 13.3 21.7 23.8 31.2 36.7 43.4 
        
Latin America and the Caribbean 5.8 13.4 20.2 24.2 28.1 34.1 36.9 
South Asia 5.6 10.0 16.0 16.0 22.3 26.7 32.7 
East Asia and the Pacific 3.2 9.0 11.2 12.9 16.6 19.5 20.3 
Middle East and North Africa 11.7 13.0 13.5 15.2 15.5 16.8 17.0 
Europe and Central Asia 3.2 8.1 11.0 11.4 11.5 12.8 12.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.9 3.2 4.9 4.9 5.1 6.0 6.1 
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2004 and World Bank estimates cited by Global 
 
Unfortuna
Development Finance 2005. Note: e = Estimate 
tely, a scarcity of data prohibits further breakdown of these remittances 
d 
eans 
n the 
heir 
in 
 of 
                                                
by country. However, anecdotal evidence and results from households’ surveys carrie
out in many African countries point to the importance and increased inflow of 
remittances.  A recent survey article on Zimbabwe shows remittances from Zimbabw
in the Diaspora to be contributing immensely to the livelihood of those left behind i
rapidly shrinking economy12.  To date, millions of Africans have left their countries in 
search of greener pastures so the potential benefits these remittances could bring to t
respective economies could enormous. As it is, remittances are associated with boosts 
human capital as immigrants are investing in education, entrepreneurship and health
their loved ones. It is therefore important that governments find means of proper 
channeling and encouraging this type of capital. 
 
 
12 http://www.gprg.org/pubs/workingpapers/pdfs/gprg-wps-045.pdf 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper has documented trends in capital flows with particular emphasis on the 
volume and structure of FDI in Africa. Three types of flows of significance to Africa are 
official development assistance, foreign direct investment and workers remittances. By 
their nature, they offer African economies some intrinsic advantages for economic 
development.  In contrast to all other developing regions, Africa has remained aid-
dependent and a marginal recipient of FDI and workers’ remittances. As such, African 
countries still need to explore factors limiting FDI and remittances flows while using the 
official assistance they are still receiving to create an investment friendly environment. 
One plausible use of official assistance would be in laying sound infrastructure key for 
attracting FDI.   
  A distinct feature of FDI flows to Africa is their sectoral bias towards natural 
resource extraction,13 which does not offer much development benefit for Africa. To 
minimize potential adverse effects of such investments, African governments must 
demand that MNCs investing in their countries follow international environmental 
guidelines.  Regarding the emerging South-South flows, Africa needs to be effective in 
collecting good data on all aspects of this investment to allow empirical analysis to 
inform appropriate policy responses. Last but not least, governments in Africa should 
think hard about how to channel worker remittances to boost their foreign currency 
reserves. Incentives need to be put in place for Africans in the Diaspora to channel their 
remittances through formal systems and ensuring that such capital is used for investment 
purposes as opposed to consumption. This naturally requires strengthening of financial 
                                                 
13 This trend, however, is being altered by increased South-South flows. 
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systems and macroeconomic stability, particularly controlling inflation. Such efforts 
could counter the brain drain as well as generate a steady stream of foreign exchange. 
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Appendix 
Source: All charts created from data from World Development Indicators 
 
A.1: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries
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A.2: Official Development Assistance and Official Aid to Developing Countries
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A.3: Workers Remittances to Developing Countries
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A.4: Portfolio Investments in Developing Countries
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A.5: Bank and Trade Related Lending in Developing Countries
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A.6: Capital Inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa, by type of inflow, 1970- 2004
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 Definitions: World Development Indicators 
Bank and trade-related lending (PPG + PNG) (NFL, current US$): Bank and trade-
related lending covers commercial bank lending and other private credits. Data are in 
current U.S. dollars. 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$): Foreign direct investment 
are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or 
more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the 
investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, 
and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. This series shows net inflows 
in the reporting economy. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
Official development assistance and official aid (current US$): Net official 
development assistance consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms 
(net of repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-
DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare in countries and territories 
in part I of the DAC list of recipients. It includes loans with a grant element of at least 25 
al aid refers to aid flows 
es in part II of the DAC 
list of recipients: more advanced countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the countries 
of the former Soviet Union, and certain advanced developing countries and territories. 
Official aid is provided under terms and conditions similar to those for ODA. Data are in 
current U.S. dollars. 
Portfolio investment, bonds (PPG + PNG) (NFL, current US$): Portfolio bond 
investment consists of bond issues purchased by foreign investors. Data are in current 
U.S. dollars. 
Workers' remittances and compensation of employees, received (US$): Workers' 
remittances and compensation of employees, received comprise current transfers by 
migrant workers and wages and salaries earned by nonresident workers. Data are in 
current U.S. dollars. 
 
 
 
 
percent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 percent). Net offici
(net of repayments) from official donors to countries and territori
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A.7: Top 10 ODA Recepients in Africa, 2002- 2004
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Source: OECD  Statistics, HUwww.oecd.org/dac/stats/regionchartsU 

